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Notes
RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN
SMALL AIRCRAFT LITIGATION
Often it is difficult to determine what caused the crash of a small
aircraft. Negligence is a likely explanation because an estimated
eighty-three percent of airplane accidents are due to pilot error.'
Assuming there was negligence, it may nevertheless be impossible
to determine the specific act of pilot negligence which caused the
accident. Seldom do survivors or eyewitnesses exist, and there may
be no clues in the wreckage. This lack of evidence points to the
potential importance of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in air crash
cases.
Several articles have been written about res ipsa loquitur in air
law,' but recent cases create a need to put the question of res ipsa
loquitur in small aircraft litigation into fresh perspective This re-
quires analysis of the difficulties encountered in applying the unique
problems of aviation to the theory of res ipsa loquitur, discussion
of three judicial approaches to res ipsa loquitur in small aircraft
cases, and consideration of the problems of practice and procedure
associated with res ipsa loquitur.
I NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, AIRCRAFT DESIGN-INDUCED PILOT
ERROR (1967), quoted in Campbell v. First Nat'l Bank, 370 F. Supp. 1096,
1098-99 (D.N.M. 1973); Davis, Private Aircraft Crash Cases, 29 TEXAS B.I. 161
(1966). For a list of 61 pilot activities causing or contributing to accidents see
Lawyer, Liability of Pilots: Plaintiff's Viewpoint, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
SMALL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT LITIGATION 61-62 (1974).
2E.g., Goldin, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law, 18 S.
CAL. L. REV. 15, 124 (1944); McLarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger
Litigation, 37 VA. L. REV. 55 (1951); Osterhout, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Lo-
quitur as Applied to Aviation, 2 AIR L. REV. 9 (1931).
The scope of this article is limited to the application of res ipsa loquitur
in crashes of small aircraft. Reference will be made to airline cases to illustrate
some points. Related instances for consideration of res ipsa loquitur include:
Blumenthal v. United States, 306 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962) (civilian lost after
bailing out of disabled military plane); United States v. Kesinger, 190 F.2d 529
(10th Cir. 1951) (damages to property on the ground caused by crash of plane);
Sapp v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. La. 1957) (injuries to persons
on the ground); Ness v. West Coast Airlines, Inc., 9 Av. Cas. 17,997 (Idaho
1965) (passenger injured by air turbulence); Cope v. Air Associates, Inc., 283
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I. THEORY OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Res ipsa loquitur, a creature of the common law,4 is a type of
circumstantial evidence concerned with the proof of negligence!
The Latin phrase means "the thing speaks for itself," or that the
circumstances of the accident imply that the accident was probably
the defendant's fault. Traditionally, the following conditions must
be met before the doctrine can be applied: (i) the accident must be
of a class which ordinarily does not occur unless someone was
negligent; (ii) the cause of the accident must be an agency or
instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendant; and
(iii) the accident-must not have been due to voluntary action or
contribution by the plaintiff.' Each of these conditions should be
examined to gain an understanding of the current relationship be-
tween res ipsa loquitur and aviation.
A. The Inference of Negligence
The first condition requires that there be an accident which ordi-
narily would not have occurred in the absence of someone's negli-
gence. Airplane cases encounter more difficulty satisfying this con-
dition than do other instances of negligence. According to one
court, the determination whether an inference of negligence arises
in a given case necessitates "a balancing of the probabilities based
upon a consideration of common knowledge, expert testimony and
all the circumstances developed by the proof."'
The jurisdictions split on the question whether common knowl-
edge justifies an inference of negligence in aviation accidents. At
first, courts refused to apply res ipsa loquitur because it was com-
mon knowledge that airplanes crashed for many reasons other than
pilot negligence For example, airplanes are especially susceptible
to the forces of nature, such as turbulence, tricky wind currents,
Ill. App. 40 (1935) (preparation and packing of parachute). See Annot., 6
A.L.R.2d 528 (1949).
4 See Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863) (a barrel of flour
rolled out of a warehouse window and hit a passing pedestrian).
6W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS S 39 (4th ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as PROSSER].
Old. § 39, at 214.
7 Newing v. Cheatham, 42 Cal. 3d 593, -, 117 Cal. Rptr. 30, 37 (1974).
8 E.g., Herndon v. Gregory, 190 Ark. 702, 81 S.W.2d 849 (1935); Wilson v.
Colonial Air Transp., Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E. 212 (1932).
ice and precipitation.! Moreover, the possibilities of mechanical
failures or defects in aircraft design make it difficult to single out
pilot error as the most likely cause of the crash. This view continues
to find support in a few jurisdictions," but impressive safety records
and great technical progress in the art of flying have caused an in-
creasing number of courts to reach an opposite conclusion."
If common knowledge is an inadequate foundation for an in-
ference of negligence, expert testimony may provide a sufficient
basis."2 The nature of the accident, such as the occurrence of an
unexpected and out-of-the-ordinary event, may also justify an
inference of negligence." For example, if an airplane with a
clean record is flown on a clear day by an inexperienced pilot, an
inference of pilot negligence should arise if the plane crashes.
Finally, the process of inferring negligence depends partly upon
the duty of care owed to the plaintiff. The higher the duty of care,
the greater the likelihood that an inference of negligence will be
raised. The pilot of a small private plane is held to that duty of
care "which an ordinarily prudent or reasonably careful pilot or
operator would use under the same or similar circumstances."' " This
is a lesser duty than that applied to common carriers; 5 conse-
9 McLarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation, 37 VA. L. REV.
55, 72-73 (1951).
'
0 E.g., Kelley v. Central Nat'l Bank, 345 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1972);
Mann v. Henderson, 261 N.C. 338, 134 S.E.2d 626 (1964).
"Rogow v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Smith v.
Pennsylvania Cent. Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp. 940 (D.D.C. 1948); Southeastern
Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436 (1962).
"Newing v. Cheatham, 42 Cal. 3d 593, 117 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1974); PROSSER
39, at 217.
3Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973)
(helicopter crashed into the ocean); Colditz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 329 F. Supp.
691 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (mid-air collision). See also Smith v. O'Donnell, 67 Cal.
App. 838, 5 P.2d 690 (1931), rev'd, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P.2d 933 (1932) (common
carrier).
14 8 AM. JuR. 2D Aviation S 66 (1963).
" As a common carrier, an airline owes its passengers a duty of utmost care
for their safety. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964);
McLarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation, 37 VA. L. REV. 55,
56-57 (1951). Because of the higher degree of care required of common carriers,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is particularly suitable in actions against them.
See L. KREINDLER, AIRCRAFT LITIGATION-3D 48, 56 (1972); Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d
528, 529-30 (1949). Contra, McLarty, supra at 89-90. Common carriers are not
liable for inevitable accidents or Acts of God, however, and there have been
many decisions exonerating airline companies. Lancaster, Aviation Law, 17 TEXAS
B.J. 587, 614 (1954).
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quently, the courts historically have been less willing to invoke
res ipsa loquitur in the crash of a private plane than in the crash
of a commercial airliner.";
B. Exclusive Control
The second requirement of res ipsa loquitur is that the event
must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclu-
sive control of the defendant. If the defendant had exclusive con-
trol and management of the airplane, he was in a better position
than anyone else to foresee and avert the catastrophe. This require-
ment is based upon the principle that liability should be imposed by
the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur only when the identity
of the person at fault is clear.
The issue of exclusive control has become the battleground in
small aircraft cases. A primary cause of the litigation in this area
has been that most private airplanes have dual controls." If more
than one occupant is a licensed pilot, it is often difficult to deter-
mine who was operating the plane at the time of the crash because
control of the plane could have changed hands several times during
a flight. Furthermore, an excited passenger could precipitate a
crash by grabbing the controls accessible to him. Another problem
has been that exclusive control over the mechanical condition of
the aircraft must be demonstrated before res ipsa loquitur can be
applied. One court held that the pilot of a rented aircraft lacked
exclusive control because the rental agency inspected and main-
tained the airplane. 8 For similar reasons, the pilot of a borrowed
aircraft would lack exclusive control." Finally, attorneys have con-
tended that certain outside influences affect exclusive control. The
courts have not accepted this argument; neither instructions from
the control tower at an airport" nor requirements prescribed by
1 See Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 528 (1949); Note, Torts-Negligence-Res Ipsa
Loquitur, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 711, 714 (1967).
"
7 The problem of dual controls is analyzed fully infra in conjunction with
the application of res ipsa loquitur to small aircraft crashes.
18 Campbell v. First Nat'l Bank, 370 F. Supp. 1096 (D.N.M. 1973). See
Wilson v. Colonial Air Transp., Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E. 212 (1932) (no
evidence of who had inspected the airplane).
19 Perhaps it could be argued that a pilot who inspected someone else's plane
before he flew it should be held responsible for its condition.
20Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436
(1962). Suits between occupants of the airplane are to be distinguished from
suits to establish negligence of an air traffic controller. In the latter instance an
the Civil Aeronautics Board21 have been held to deprive the pilot
of exclusive control of the airplane. Although regulations govern
the height at which planes travel, one court found exclusive con-
trol because the pilot's complete physical control of the mechanism
meant he could disregard the regulations, if necessary, for the im-
mediate safety of his passengers." Considering these three aspects
of exclusive control together, the current test seems to be that a
pilot has exclusive control if he is responsible for both the mechani-
cal condition of the plane and the physical control of the plane in
flight.
C. No Action by Plaintiff
The final condition which must be met before the courts will
apply res ipsa loquitur is that the aircraft accident must not have
been caused by any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the plaintiff. This condition is concerned with the defenses of con-
tributory negligence23 and assumption of the risk. For example, a
potential contributory negligence situation exists in small airplanes
equipped with dual controls. In one case the court found contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff by showing that the
plaintiff had stepped on a rudder control, causing the plane to spin
into a crash.' It was reasoned in early cases that travel by air was
so dangerous that anyone entering an airplane had assumed the
risk of an accident." As air travel became safer, the defense of
assumption of the risk lost most of its impact. Knowledge of the
general risks of aviation is no longer sufficient to invoke the defense
because those general risks have decreased with improved tech-
nology."2 Assumption of the risk is now a proper subject for the
air traffic controller's instructions to a pilot are regarded as mandatory, not
merely advisory. Yates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974); Allen
v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
21 "This is merely confounding control of the plane with regulation by public
authority." Haasman v. Pacific Alas. Air Express, 100 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Alas.
1951), aff'd sub nom. Des Marais v. Beckman, 198 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953).
22 Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217, 219-20 n.3 (2d Cir. 1951).
23 See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 858 (1961).
24 Crawford v. Rogers, 406 P.2d 189 (Alas. 1965).
2
1 See, e.g., Cohn v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 17 F. Supp. 865 (D.
Wyo. 1937).
" Goldin, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law, 18 S. CAL.
L. REv. 15, 36 (1944).
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jury only when the plaintiff is fully informed about specific risks
prior to his flight."
II. APPLICATION OF THEORY TO SMALL AIRCRAFT CRASHES
Case law involving res ipsa loquitur in small aircraft litigation
can be separated into three categories according to the theories
applied by courts. Some courts hold that res ipsa loquitur cannot
be applied because any verdict on the issues of negligence and
causation would be based on mere conjecture." Other courts hold
that the circumstantial evidence permits the questions of negligence
and pilot identity to go to the jury;" a third group of courts resolves
the problems by deeming the pilot in command to have exclusive
control." These different approaches relate to all three elements of
27 Krause v. Chartier, 406 F.2d 898 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
960 (1969). For other defenses to res ipsa loquitur see Roberts v. TWA, 225
Cal. App. 2d 344, 37 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1964) (a showing of utmost care and
diligence on the part of the defendant) (common carrier); Nelson v. American
Airlines, Inc., 263 Cal. App. 2d 742, 70 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1968) (evidence did not
provide defense of proof of the exact cause of the accident, nor did it show the
accident was preventable).
2 8 See Morrison v. LeTourneau Co., 138 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1943); Campbell
v. First Nat'l Bank, 370 F. Supp. 1096 (D.N.M. 1974); Kelley v. Central Nat'l
Bank, 345 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1972); Herndon v. Gregory, 190 Ark. 702,
81 S.W.2d 849 (1935); In re Estate of Rivers, 175 Kan. 809, 267 P.2d 506
(1954); In re Hayden's Estate, 174 Kan. 140, 254 P.2d 813 (1953); Wilson v.
Colonial Air Transp., Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E. 212 (1932); Madyck v.
Shelley, 283 Mich. 396, 278 N.W. 110 (1938); Mitchell v. Eyre, 190 Neb. 182,
206 N.W.2d 839 (1973); Mann v. Henderson, 261 N.C. 338, 134 S.E.2d 626
(1964); Budgett v. Soo Sky Ways, Inc., 64 S.D. 243, 266 N.W. 253 (1936);
Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S.W.2d 806 (1943); Hall v. Payne, 189
Va. 140, 52 S.E.2d 76 (1949).
29See Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379
(9th Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Trihey v. Transocean Air
Lines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958); Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Larsen,
214 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1954); Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217
(2d Cir. 1951); Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.
La. 1973); Colditz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Insurance Co. of N. America v. Butte Aero Sales & Serv., 243 F. Supp. 276 (D.
Mont. 1965); Newing v. Cheatham, 42 Cal. 3d 593, 117 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1974);
Whittemore v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 65 Cal. App. 737, 151 P.2d 670 (1944);
Bird v. Louer, 272 Ill. App. 522 (1933); Drahmann's Adm'rx v. Brink's Adm'rx,
290 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956); Abbott v. Page Airways, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d
502, 245 N.E.2d 388, 297 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1969); Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Serv.,
Inc., 231 N.C. 181, 56 S.E.2d 560 (1949); Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd,
209 Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436 (1962).
11 Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Serv., Inc., 259 Minn. 460, 108 N.W.2d 428
(1961); Collins v. Stroh, 426 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
res ipsa loquitur, but to avoid repetitious analysis, discussion of
each judicial approach will focus upon the element of exclusive
control.
Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable if a passenger was in actual
control of the plane,"1 but when it is clear that only the pilot was
indeed flying the plane, res ipsa loquitur has been applied.' The
difficult cases are those in which it is not clear who was the pilot.
Proof of the identity of the pilot is usually based upon circum-
stantial evidence. Some circumstances demonstrating that a par-
ticular occupant was the pilot are that he owned the plane, was
the only occupant who held a license, was listed on the flight plan
as the pilot in command, had the most flying experience of the
occupants, was in the habit of controlling the plane, was seated
in the position customarily occupied by the pilot, and was in com-
munication with the control tower.' Also relevant are the post-
crash circumstances. Damage to only one set of controls suggests
that those were the controls used at the moment of impact.' A
pathologist's autopsy report stating that the occupants had different
patterns of broken bones could show that only one occupant braced
himself in anticipation of an imminent crash.' Thus, the issue
often becomes what quantum of circumstantial evidence is re-
quired to establish the identity of the pilot.
A. The Conjecture Theory
The conjecture theory represents one judicial attitude toward
circumstantial evidence and exclusive control. Courts that accept
31 Parker v. James Granger, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 66, 52 P.2d 226 (1935), appeal
dismissed, 298 U.S. 644 (1936); Piper v. Henson Flying Serv., 191 Md. 240, 60
A.2d 675 (1948). But see Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Serv., Inc., 259 Minn.
460, 108 N.W.2d 428 (1961), holding the pilot in command responsible regard-
less of whether he was actually at the controls.
11 Ferrell v. Topp, 386 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1964) (no evidence that plaintiff's
decedent had operated the plane at all). See Butts v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co.,
266 F. Supp. 739 (M.D. Tenn. 1967). "The facts show that he owned the plane,
that he started out on the fatal trip flying the plane, and that no one else was
in the plane with access to the controls who was capable of flying the plane."
Id. at 741.
13 2 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, Aviation Proof No. 3, Identity of Person Pi-
loting Dual Controlled Plane 123 (Supp. 1974); Davis, Private Aircraft Crash
Cases, 29 TEXAS B.J. 161, 203 (1966).
"But see In re Hayden's Estate, 174 Kan. 140, 254 P.2d 813 (1953).
"3Address by attorney Windle Turley, Medico-Legal Problems course, School
of Law, Southern Methodist University, Mar. 13, 1975.
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this theory declare that the circumstantial evidence of the identity
of the pilot is inconclusive; they conclude that it would be specula-
tive to say whose negligence caused the crash." One recent case,
Mitchell v. Eyre,37 held that a plaintiff must not only establish the
identity of the operator of the aircraft at the time of the accident,
but, when the aircraft is equipped with dual controls and both
occupants are pilots, proof showing who operated the aircraft at
the time of take-off will not be conclusive evidence to establish
who was operating the plane one hour later at the time of the
crash. The effect of the conjecture theory, therefore, is to preclude
application of res ipsa loquitur.
Dual controls provide the key to the conjecture theory. The mere
fact that an airplane was equipped with dual controls has been held
to indicate that the plane was not in the exclusive control of the
defendant. 8 According to the theory, if a crash may have been
caused by one occupant's handling of the controls available to him
or by another occupant's handling of the second set of controls,
then it would be a mere guess to say who was the pilot." It is con-
tended that the proven facts in the crash of a dual control plane
give equal support to each of two inconsistent inferences. The
courts conclude that because neither inference is established, judg-
ment must go against the plaintiff, the party who had the burden
of establishing one inference against the other."
It is interesting to note that the burden of proof provokes a dif-
ferent result in suits concerning the exclusionary clauses of pilots'
insurance policies. In American Casualty Co. v. Mitchell," a suit
arising from the same crash discussed in Mitchell v. Eyre,' an
exclusionary clause eliminated coverage of a person while he was
I "Judgments may not find a landing place in the field of conjecture alone."
Madyck v. Shelley, 283 Mich. 396, -, 278 N.W. 110, 112 (1938).
"r 190 Neb. 182, 206 N.W.2d 839 (1973). The issue is framed in terms of the
burden of proof rather than res ipsa loquitur, but the problems are identical,
and the court cites cases that did discuss res ipsa loquitur.
" McWilliam v. Thunder Bay Flying Club, [1950] Ont. W.N. 696. Contra,
Collins v. Stroh, 426 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
" Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S.W.2d 806 (1943). See, e.g., In re
Hayden's Estate, 174 Kan. 140, 254 P.2d 813 (1953); Budgett v. Soo Sky Ways,
Inc., 64 S.D. 243, 266 N.W. 253 (1936).
40 Morrison v. LeTourneau Co., 138 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1943).
41393 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1968).
42 190 Neb. 182, 206 N.W.2d 839 (1973).
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operating, or learning to operate, or performing duties as a mem-
ber of the crew of any aircraft. The insurance company had the
burden of sustaining the inference that plaintiff had been the pilot
of a dual control plane. Since the company could not prove that an
occupant was operating the controls by proving the possibility that
he could have been operating the controls, the company was held
liable on the policy.
The weakness in the conjecture theory is its requirement of an
unrealistic standard of proof. The plaintiff must completely negate
the possibility that someone other than the defendant was at the
controls. This "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is appropriate
only in criminal cases. It is inappropriate and unfair to invoke such
a high standard in a civil suit, especially when it is invoked before
the plaintiff gets his case into the juryroom. To avoid a directed
verdict the plaintiff should be required to show only some evidence
that the defendant was flying the plane. ' The very nature of such
an inquiry causes this proof to be largely circumstantial and it
should be weighed by the jury.
Although courts which follow the conjecture theory announce
that speculation should not determine the outcome of cases, they
allow speculative possibility regarding what may have occurred to
overcome reasonable inferences raised by the circumstantial evi-
dence. The evidence usually indicates that one man probably was
the pilot; the courts are the ones who speculate that the other occu-
pant might have used his own set of controls. Such a result borders
too closely on an assumption that the second occupant either was
the pilot or was guilty of contributory negligence."
B. The Pilot in Command Theory
Under this approach to the problem of exclusive control, the
pilot in command, ' the occupant who had a right to control the
aircraft, is held responsible for the accident even though he may
not have been the negligent party. Even when the crash might have
been caused by the negligence of a passenger, that negligence is
imputed to the pilot in command. The jury must decide who was
the pilot in command and that determination is then conclusive
4 Davis, Private Airplane Crash Cases, 29 TEXAS B.J. 161, 203 (1966).
44 10 J. AIR L. & CoM. 415, 416 n.7 (1939).
4 The pilot in command is "the pilot responsible for the operation and safety
of an aircraft during flight time." 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1974).
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on the issue of exclusive control, for the pilot in command is
deemed to be in exclusive control of the aircraft as a matter of law.
Because this is the newest of the three approaches to the issue
of exclusive control, few cases have utilized this rationale. The
leading case, Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Service, Inc.," held that
in the absence of extenuating circumstances, the pilot in command
is responsible for the negligent operation of the airplane regardless
of his presence or absence from the controls at the time of the
accident. The requirement of exclusive control is thus relaxed;
proof of the right to control the plane permits the use of res ipsa
loquitur, and the mere presence of dual controls does not in itself
prevent application of the doctrine." The Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration's regulations concerning the pilot in command and the
flight plan which reveals the name of the pilot in command of the
particular flight are relevant to establish liability under this theory. 8
A criticism of the pilot in command theory is that it charges
the pilot in command not only with exclusive physical control dur-
ing the flight but also with exclusive control of the mechanical
condition of the plane. The pilot in command of a rented or bor-
rowed airplane should not be held responsible for its mechanical
condition." This criticism is symptomatic of the inherent nature
of the theory: liability is imposed regardless of fault; consequently,
a party innocent of blame might be held responsible. The extent to
which the pilot in command approach should apply to small air-
craft accidents is a policy question. Because the theory is so simi-
48259 Minn. 460, 108 N.W.2d 428 (1961). Although the court refused to de-
cide whether res ipsa loquitur was technically applicable, the court discussed ex-
clusive control and the liability of the pilot in command. One writer praised the
holding as "admirable." Lambert, Comments on Recent Important Aviation
Cases, 28 NACCA L.J. 434, 442 (1961-62).
4 "The fact that he occupied a cockpit which was provided with controls does
not compel a conclusion that the aircraft was not under the exclusive control
of the pilot in command." Ayer v. Boyle, 12 Av. Cas. 18,365, 18,368 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1974). "[H]e would be chargeable of the negligence of Cooper even if
Cooper had been operating the controls, for he had the 'right of control.'" Col-
lins v. Stroh, 426 S.W.2d 681, 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (suit by third party).
"8 Pappas v. Pieper, 325 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1959).
4' Cases cited notes 18-19 supra. "We do not question the plaintiffs' assertion
that under the applicable federal regulations Birdseye, as 'pilot in command,' was
'directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that air-
craft.' 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1973). This does not, however, compel the con-
clusion that the airplane was under his exclusive control. He had rented it ....
Campbell v. First Nat'l Bank, 370 F. Supp. 1096, 1098 (D.N.M. 1973).
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lar to strict liability and because strict liability is often associated
with a high duty of care,"0 this theory seems most conducive to
situations in which the pilot in command owed a duty of greater
than ordinary care to the other occupants of the airplane. Appro-
priate situations for its application in small aircraft litigation would
include the business invitee relationship 1 and the instructor-trainee
relationship."
C. The. Weight-o-the-Evidence Theory
A number of jurisdictions approach the problem of exclusive
control by holding that circumstantial evidence raises a question of
fact concerning the identity of the pilot." The basis for this theory,
as stated by one court, is that "[w]here the evidence is entirely cir-
cumstantial a party should not be deprived of competent, relevant
evidence because it is not of great strength. Many threads may
make a rope."' The effect of the introduction of the evidence is
that the case goes to the jury so that the jury may weigh all the
pieces of evidence concerning pilot identity as a question of fact.
If the jury finds exclusive control, then it must consider whether
the other requirements of res ipsa loquitur are also satisfied. If the
jury determines that exclusive control has not been established by
a preponderance of the evidence, then res ipsa loquitur is not
applied.
Compared with the conjecture theory and the pilot in command
theory, this theory offers the greatest potential for substantial jus-
tice. There is no automatic verdict for either party because the final
5OSee PROSSER § 81.
21 See Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Larsen, 214 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1954).
22 Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Serv., Inc., 259 Minn. 460, 108 N.W.2d 428
(1961).
2" Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Larsen, 214 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1954) (owner
of the plane was using the radio) (business invitee case); Insurance Co. of N.
America v. Butte Aero Sales & Serv., 243 F. Supp. 276 (D. Mont. 1965) (owner
was seated in the left hand seat); Whittemore v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 65
Cal. App. 2d 737, 151 P.2d 670 (1944); Bird v. Louer, 272 Ill. App. 522 (1933)
(one occupant was an experienced pilot; the other occupant had never flown
an airplane); Drahmann's Adm'rx v. Brink's Adm'rx, 290 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1956) (plane was landing at the time of the crash, and all prior landings
had been made by the owner); Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Serv., Inc., 231 N.C. 181,
56 S.E.2d 560 (1949) (strong inference that pilot in forward seat continued
operation of plane during maneuvers).
5 Whittemore v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 65 Cal. App. 2d 737, -, 151 P.2d
670, 678 (1944).
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determination is based on a flexible question of fact rather than
on an absolute rule of law. The test should be whether there is
circumstantial evidence of one or more facts from which the iden-
tity of the pilot may reasonably be inferred." If reasonable men
can differ about the conclusion to be drawn, then this is the type
of conflict which should be resolved by a jury." The weight-of-the-
evidence theory is especially suitable for most small aircraft cases
because an ordinary duty rather than a high degree of care is
usually the required standard.
III. PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
The plaintiff's attorney initially must make a decision about the
relevance of res ipsa loquitur to his case. If the proximate cause
of the crash is clearly something other than negligence and no one
is at fault, res ipsa loquitur is irrelevant." Res ipsa loquitur is valu-
able in three instances: (i) if the evidence suggests negligence but
it is impossible to prove the specific cause of the accident, e.g.,
when evidence indicates inadequate maintenance of the aircraft;
(ii) if neither negligence nor causation can be proven, e.g., when
an airplane has disappeared over the sea without a trace; or (iii)
if both negligence and causation can be proven but the plaintiff
wants to rely upon both the specific act of negligence and res ipsa
loquitur.'
Because local laws differ regarding the use of inconsistent
pleadings, a conflict persists whether res ipsa loquitur can be in-
voked if the plaintiff has also pleaded and proved specific acts of
negligence." Early decisions in New York"° and Texas"' held res ipsa
loquitur inapplicable when the plaintiff also relied upon specific
"See PROSSER § 39, at 212.
56 PROSSER § 37, at 208. It is the function of a jury to weigh the probative
value of the evidence and decide whether there is a preponderance of evidence
in favor of the plaintiff. 2A C.J.S. Aeronautics & Aerospace § 173 (1972); PRos-
SER § 38, at 208.
5'Kreindler, Using Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airplane Crash Cases, 64 CASE &
COM. 3, 8 (Nov.-Dec. 1959).
1i Id. at 6-10.
"Goldin, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law, 18 S. CAL.
L. REV. 15, 124 (1944); Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 1335 (1965).
60 Goodheart v. American Airlines, 252 App. Div. 660, 1 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1937).
6English v. Miller, 43 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
acts of negligence; however, a recent decision in New York" an-
nounced a different result, holding it proper to allow a case to go
to the jury on both the theory of res ipsa loquitur and evidence of
specific acts of negligence. When local law permits the plaintiff to
plead both res ipsa loquitur and specific acts of negligence, plain-
tiff's attorney must make a very important strategy decision. His
alternatives are to plead only the specific acts, to plead only res
ipsa loquitur, or to plead both res ipsa loquitur and the specific acts
of negligence. Arguments exist for and against each course of ac-
tion. When specific acts of negligence may be proved, the plaintiff
has a better chance for a favorable verdict and the indignation of
the jury is likely to result in higher damages;63 however, plaintiff
risks being unable to prove the specific acts constituting negligence.
On the other hand, if the plaintiff pleads only res ipsa loquitur his
case may be less appealing to a jury because it lacks evidence of
wrongdoing. One practicing lawyer recommends that the plaintiff
argue both res ipsa loquitur and any specific acts of negligence."
This maintains flexibility at trial while increasing the plaintiff's
chances for recovery. Usually proof of the specific acts of negli-
gence should be the first part of plaintiff's attack." If the cause of
the accident is unknown, however, the best strategy may be to hold
the specific evidence in reserve to use against the opposing party's
defenses to res ipsa loquitur The danger in such a strategy is
that the plaintiff can only rebut the defendant's defenses and he
might not be allowed to prove a new theory at that point in the
trial."
The procedural effects of invoking res ipsa loquitur are import-
ant to learn since jurisdictions vary in their treatment of the doc-
trine.6" In some jurisdictions res ipsa loquitur raises a presumption
62 Abbott v. Page Airways, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 502, 245 N.E.2d 388, 297 N.Y.S.2d
713 (1969) (helicopter crash), noted in 33 ALBANY L. REV. 660 (1969). See
Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436 (1962)
(plaintiff does not lose the benefit of res ipsa loquitur by alleging specific acts
of negligence which he fails to prove).
63 Kreindler, Using Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airplane Crash Cases, 64 CASE &
COM. 3, 4 (Nov.- Dec. 1959).
64L. KREINDLER, AIRCRAFT LITIGATION-3d 49 (1972).
5Id. at 53.
MId. at 50.
6 71 Id. at 53.
"See PROSSER § 40.
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of negligence that can entitle the plaintiff to a directed verdict;,
in other jurisdictions the doctrine establishes a prima facie case of
negligence that precludes a directed verdict for the defendant;"0
but in the majority view, the effect of res ipsa loquitur is to make
negligence a permissible inference which the jury may draw."' Be-
cause the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur depends upon local
law, counsel must study the statutes and decisions of his particular
jurisdiction.
The final problem is whether res ipsa loquitur is a matter of
procedure or one of substance in conflict of laws situations. The
majority rule is that the application of res ipsa loquitur is a pro-
cedural matter governed by the law of the forum." A minority of
jurisdictions hold that res ipsa loquitur presents a question of sub-
stantive law and that the forum court must look to the law of the
jurisdiction wherein the accident occurred.'
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The application of res ipsa loquitur to crashes of small aircraft
has been litigated in dozens of jurisdictions over a period covering
more than forty years. Although the courts agree upon the elements
necessary to define the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the courts have
not consistently applied the law to the facts. The first decisions
denied the inference of negligence in small aircraft accidents.
Changes in aviation have led an increasing number of courts now
to believe that these accidents do not occur in the absence of some-
one's negligence. Common knowledge about the safety of air travel,
once an obstacle to res ipsa loquitur, now often supports an appli-
cation of the doctrine. A split of authority persists, however, and
61 Collgood, Inc. v. Sands Drug Co., 5 I1. App. 3d 910, 284 N.E.2d 406
(1972) (fire in warehouse; inference of negligence is so strong that reasonable
men cannot reject it); Schechter v. Hann, 305 Ky. 794, 205 S.W.2d 690 (1947)
(automobile case); Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 522 (1964).
70 Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951) (res ipsa
loquitur merely raises an inference of negligence sufficient to establish a prima
facie case, and does not establish a presumption of negligence; plaintiff retains
the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence).
' Trihey v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958) (al-
though the facts may warrant an inference of negligence under res ipsa loquitur,
they do not compel that inference).
"2See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
73 Smith v. Pennsylvania Cent. Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp. 940 (D.D.C. 1948).
NOTES
a new obstacle to the inference of negligence may be the develop-
ment of products liability law. Manufacturers' liability for defec-
tive airplanes, conceived as a weapon for the plaintiff, could be-
come an important tool for the defendant pilot in a res ipsa loquitur
case. The defendant could argue that because manufacturers are
found at fault in many recent products liability cases, no inference
of pilot negligence can be raised from the happening of an acci-
dent.
The requirement for exclusive control has eroded in negligence
law in general' and can be expected to erode in air law as well.
The conjecture and the pilot in command theories illustrate two
polar extremes in judicial response to exclusive control of small
aircraft. In some instances these theories might be appropriate, but
in general the weight to be given circumstantial evidence concern-
ing the identity of the pilot of a dual control plane should be a fact
question for the jury. After comparing and contrasting all three
approaches, it is clear that the weight-of-the-evidence theory is the
most desirable.
Res ipsa loquitur is no panacea for the problems of small aircraft
litigation. Even when the plaintiff seeks to invoke the doctrine,
his attorney still must be fully prepared on the technical aspects of
the case,' and also must watch for new appellate decisions because
res ipsa loquitur is a dynamic area of air law.
Steven R. Fredrickson
74 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (medical mal-
practice); Hugo v. Manning, 201 Kan. 391, 441 P.2d 145 (1968) (injury to cus-
tomer or patron); Beaudoin v. Watertown Memorial Hosp., 32 Wis. 2d 132, 145
N.W.2d 166 (1966) (medical malpractice).
" See Finley, Trial Technique in Aviation Accident Cases, 31 TExAs L. REv.
809, 818 (1953).
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